Hamid Karzai has his work cut out for him. Afghanistan’s problem is a lot more than corruption and lackadaisical attitude to leadership. For most people on this side of the street, the only lens to judge the inactions of the Afghan people is through Hamid Karzai, and rightfully so, he is the president. A few months ago, his legitimacy was stifled by allegations of corruption and nepotism, a sentiment still very much alive among many people outside Kabul. Now that the presidential election drama is in the rear view mirror, the real work begins. Let’s face it, the United States is not the only country pouring cash and blood into Afghanistan in the hope that it will pay some dividends in freedom and practical sovereignty. First, the Taliban remains active in the region, and insider reports suggest that the Afghan government is no where near finding practical solutions. The problem is that the unconditional support from the American public is fading fast, and many more demanding accountability, and for the Afghans themselves to ‘step up’. Securing Afghanistan is no easy task (no one said it will), and there is no doubt that offering support for the Karzai government is not a bad idea to combat terrorism, but at some point even the Ghandi’s and Mother Teresa’s will start assessing opportunity costs, and start looking for the exit signs.
There is also the much publicized corruption story, which rubs everyone the wrong way, and for obvious reasons. If the rest of the world chooses to sacrifice their taxpayer dollars for the provision of basic amenities for the Afghan people, nothing spells the ‘F-word’ than corrupt leaders in the very government you are going to extremes to help.
Once upon a time, the talk of the town was training Afghanistan’s military forces to let them fight their own battle. That proposition is based on the assertion that the Afghan forces are interested in fighting the Taliban, one story I’m not completely sold on.Then there was the idea of reaching out to the moderate Talibans, an inherently intriguing idea in itself. In any case, how did all these ‘bright’ ideas vanish, or turn into whether to approve or deny General McChrystal’s additional 40,000 troops plan? Of course I have never been a military general, (I may not even make it past basic training) but there is no bigger disincentive for the Afghans themselves than expressing any more commitment than is already shown. Of course, that is my business mind running through profitability ratios and mapping out my profit maximization curves.
My point? President Hamid Karzai will have to do a lot more than give solemn speeches and promise the world that the Afghans are ready to rise up to the challenge. It’s about time.
